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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 




HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Tyshaun St. Vallier appeals an order of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2). We will affirm. 
I 
In December 2016, after some eight years in federal prison, St. Vallier asked the 
District Court to reduce his 204-month sentence because Amendment 782 to the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines retroactively reduced his drug offense calculation by two 
levels. See USSG App. C, Amend. 782 (eff. Nov. 1, 2014); USSG § 1B1.10(d). St. 
Vallier argued that he no longer posed a threat to public safety since he had maintained a 
good disciplinary record while incarcerated and he demonstrated “a changed way of 
thinking” through education and employment. App. 42–43. St. Vallier also argued that 
his sentence should take into account the 48-month sentence imposed on Ezra McCombs, 
a cooperating co-conspirator who was later learned to have underrepresented his criminal 
history. 
The District Court denied St. Vallier’s motion. In doing so, the judge completed a 
standard form issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Form AO-
247), which certified that the District Court had considered the motion, along with 
Guidelines § 1B1.10’s policy statements regarding sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2), and “the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that 
they are applicable.” App. 2. The District Court also referenced the factors it had 
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considered at St. Vallier’s initial sentencing and resentencing (to correct a Guidelines 
calculation error), and opined that St. Vallier continued to pose a threat to public safety. 
II1 
  In this appeal, St. Vallier claims the District Court’s denial of his motion for a 
reduced sentence was procedurally unsound because the Court failed to meaningfully 
consider or adequately explain its rejection of his arguments or its application of the 
§ 3553(a) factors. Because under § 3582(c)(2) “[t]he determination as to whether a 
reduction is warranted . . . is committed to the discretion of the district court,” we review 
the District Court’s decision for abuse of that discretion. United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 
151, 153 (3d Cir. 2009). And it bears noting that an adjudication of a § 3582(c)(2) motion 
“do[es] not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant.” USSG § 1B1.10(a)(3); see 
also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010). It “is not a do-over of an original 
sentencing proceeding where a defendant is cloaked in rights mandated by statutory law 
and the Constitution.” Styer, 573 F.3d at 154 (citation omitted); see also id. at 153 
(holding that, unlike a resentencing, defendants are “not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing” on a § 3582(c)(2) motion).  
 The crux of St. Vallier’s appeal is his claim that the District Court committed 
procedural error by “fail[ing] to mention and consider” his rehabilitation and disparity 
arguments. St. Vallier Br. 29. Neither the “mere recitals” of the AO-247 form nor the 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Our jurisdiction lies 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
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District Court’s additional explanation, he claims, sufficed to show a decision based on 
the record then before the Court, rather than the record as it stood at his initial sentencing 
or resentencing. Id. at 28–29. We disagree.  
 As the Supreme Court explained just a few months ago, the level of explanation 
required in adjudicating a § 3582(c)(2) motion “depends . . . upon the circumstances of 
the particular case.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018). In 
Chavez-Meza, the Court found the district court’s use of the AO-247 form—without 
additional explanation—to be sufficient in granting a sentence reduction that was 
disproportionate, even assuming “purely for argument’s sake” that the level of 
explanation required was equivalent to that required at an original sentencing. Id. The 
Court clarified that a district judge’s statements in prior sentencing proceedings may be 
considered on appellate review, since they “shed[] light” on whether the “record as a 
whole” reflects reasoned judgment. Id. at 1967.  
The record in this case demonstrates that the District Court’s denial of St. Vallier’s 
motion was not an abuse of discretion. As in Chavez-Meza, the district judge who 
originally sentenced St. Vallier is the same judge who considered his § 3582(c)(2) 
motion. And also like Chavez-Meza, in light of the extensive record before the District 
Court and the thorough explanations offered in prior proceedings, “there was not much 
else for the judge to say.” Id. Given St. Vallier’s lengthy criminal history, his pretrial 
flight, and credible allegations that he had plotted to murder a cooperating witness, the 
District Court’s statements demonstrated a “reasoned appraisal” of the relevant factors. 
Styer, 573 F.3d at 155 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007)). 
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The fact that the District Court was not persuaded by St. Vallier’s admirable 
prison record and his sentencing disparity argument does not mean that it ignored them.2 
See id. at 154. Rather, the District Court noted in its order that it had considered St. 
Vallier’s motion, along with the relevant policy statements and § 3553(a) factors. Indeed, 
the District Court supplemented the form by explaining that the concerns it expressed at 
St. Vallier’s prior sentencing proceedings still applied, and that St. Vallier continued to 
represent a risk to public safety. St. Vallier may “disagree[] with the comparatively little 
weight,” id., the District Court gave his arguments, but he has not shown an abuse of 
discretion. 
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
                                                 
2 The Guideline application notes make clear, furthermore, that the District Court 
was not required to consider St. Vallier’s post-sentencing conduct. Compare USSG 
§ 1B1.10 cmt. 1(B)(iii) (providing that a district court “may consider post-sentencing 
conduct”), with id. § 1B1.10 cmt. 1(B)(i)–(ii) (providing that a district court “shall 
consider” the § 3553(a) factors and public safety).  
